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The Affordable Care Act provides 
for the operation of health insurance 
exchanges by states. Health insurance 
exchanges are organized marketplaces 
for the purpose of providing 
coordination and guidance to insurers 
and helping them to comply with 
consumer protections and compete 
in cost-effective ways. In addition, 
exchanges will determine applicants’ 
eligibility for subsidies and ensure 
efficient plan enrollment. They are 
likely to play a role in centralized 
marketing, risk adjustment and 
implementation of cost-containment 
strategies. Thus, exchanges will have a 
broad array of roles and a complex set 
of responsibilities. As such, some states, 
particularly smaller ones, may consider 
developing and operating an exchange 
jointly with another state or states. The 
law permits the establishment of multi-
state exchanges at state discretion. This 
brief describes potential rationales for 
states to form multi-state exchanges and 
the issues raised by doing so.
Under the law, each state will establish 
and operate an exchange for individual 
health insurance coverage starting 
January 1, 2014. The exchange will not 
be an exclusive market for individual 
coverage; instead, individual policies 
could continue to be sold through 
the individual market outside the 
exchange. States will also establish 
Small Business Health Option Programs 
(SHOP exchanges) for small-group 
health insurance coverage. The SHOP 
exchange will not be an exclusive 
market either; instead, small businesses 
will have the choice to purchase small-
group policies outside the exchange, 
to self-fund, or to not offer coverage 
at all. Although the exchanges will 
not constitute exclusive marketplaces, 
insurers will be required to pool 
risk regardless of where coverage 
is sold.2 Specifically, insurers will 
be required to consider all of their 
individual policyholders (both in and 
out of the exchange) as members of 
a single risk pool. Likewise, insurers 
will be required to consider all of 
their small-group policyholders (in 
and out of the exchange) as members 
of a single risk pool. Risk adjustment 
guidelines will be developed by the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services and applied to all individual 
and small-group policies (other than 
grandfathered policies) sold within and 
outside exchanges. States will have the 
option of merging their individual and 
small-group markets and may opt to 
have one exchange to serve both.
Qualified individuals and small 
businesses could participate in the 
exchange. The law defines a small 
employer as a firm with up to 100 
employees. States will have discretion 
to allow larger employers to participate 
in the exchange beginning in 2017. 
Exchange duties under the ACA will 
include the following:
•	 certifying, recertifying, decertifying 
and rating qualified health plans;
•	maintaining a Web site through 
which individuals may obtain 
comparative information on  
available plans;
•	providing information to consumers 
on health benefit plan options in a 
standardized format;
•	providing eligibility information and 
enrollment assistance for Medicaid 
and children’s health insurance  
plans (CHIP);
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•	providing information to households 
on eligibility for subsidies to defray 
the costs associated with exchange 
plans and after-subsidy household 
costs of coverage;
•	 identifying and documenting 
appropriate households as being 
exempt from the new requirement  
to obtain coverage;
•	 establishing and maintaining a toll-
free telephone hotline for providing 
consumer support; and
•	 transferring appropriate information 
to the Treasury Department.
States may choose to have their 
exchanges take on other responsibilities 
as well, for example, interacting with 
their state departments of insurance 
to support oversight of insurer 
compliance with market regulations. 
States will be allowed to establish 
subsidiary exchanges as long as each 
subsidiary operates in a geographically 
distinct area (for example, for northern 
and southern California). States can 
also establish regional or interstate 
exchanges with Secretarial approval.
Four rationales for establishing multi-
state exchanges. States might consider 
joining together to offer regional or 
multi-state exchanges for four reasons. 
First, administrative economies 
of scale could be significant. 
Exchanges will need to develop subsidy 
administration and eligibility protocols, 
consumer ombudsman services, plan 
comparison materials and other new 
programs and functions in order to 
organize health insurance markets and 
make them operate more competitively. 
It might make sense, for example, for 
several small states to join together 
and undertake these tasks in common. 
Within multi-state exchanges, however, 
it would be important for each state’s 
department of insurance to retain its 
regulatory jurisdiction and authority. 
Second, regional exchanges 
might also make sense in large 
metropolitan areas that cross state 
boundaries. Residents may reside in 
one jurisdiction but work and obtain 
health insurance in another. Today, in 
advance of health reform, insurers make 
adjustments in order to do business in 
such areas. For example, two Blue Cross 
Blue Shield (BCBS) plans operate in 
Kansas—Kansas BCBS and Kansas City 
BCBS. Kansas BCBS operates statewide 
except for the Kansas City metro area. 
Kansas City BCBS sells coverage only in 
the metro area and is licensed in both 
Kansas and Missouri. To the extent 
these two states have different rules 
governing health insurance, Kansas 
City BCBS follows the more stringent 
rule for all of its policies. In the context 
of health reform that provides for 
individual and employer mandates, it 
will be important to adopt structures 
that facilitate the purchase of coverage, 
making health insurance as affordable, 
efficient, and administratively simple 
as possible. For firms whose workers 
reside in different jurisdictions, regional 
exchanges could simplify coverage 
choices, the administration of subsidies, 
enforcement of mandates, and other key 
reform changes. 
Third, states might establish multi-
state exchanges to promote pooling 
across state lines. States jointly 
operating an exchange could choose 
to have insurers set identical prices for 
products sold in both states. However, 
whether risk pooling across state lines 
might occur would depend on the 
rating areas for health insurance that 
states establish. As discussed above, it 
seems unlikely that a lower-cost state 
would agree to pool risks and costs 
with a higher-cost state. Under the 
law, states will establish geographic 
rating areas for health insurance, 
subject to federal approval. Therefore, 
for example, even though Kansas 
and Missouri might decide to jointly 
operate a single exchange for their 
residents, if the cost of coverage across 
these two states is very dissimilar, they 
might decide to maintain distinct rating 
areas within the exchange for Kansas 
and Missouri and might even maintain 
substate rating areas.
Fourth, multi-state exchanges could 
create the necessary critical mass 
of insured persons to establish 
stable risk pools by combining 
markets in small population states. 
The minimum size for a credible risk 
pool is generally perceived to be 
about 100,000 lives. Thus, multi-state 
exchanges could be particularly useful 
for sparsely populated regions of the 
United States. Buettgens, Holahan and 
Carroll (2011) estimate the enrollment 
in state non-group health insurance 
exchanges under the ACA, based 
upon 2011 population estimates.3 For 
example, they estimate enrollment 
in the non-group health insurance 
exchanges of Vermont, the District of 
Columbia, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Wyoming, Alaska and Hawaii at 48,000, 
49,000, 76,000, 82,000, 58,000, 61,000 
and 64,000, respectively. Theoretically, 
at least, these states could participate 
in exchanges jointly with other states 
in order to establish more financially 
sound pools. However, obstacles 
could occur that would prevent cross-
state exchanges from achieving such 
critical mass. For example, to operate 
in a multi-state exchange and operate 
everywhere within it, insurers would 
need to develop and maintain provider 
networks that reached broadly across 
the participating states. A Wyoming 
insurer may be unable to establish 
a robust provider network in Idaho, 
for example. In addition, introducing 
additional plans into small population 
areas could further fragment existing 
risk pools, particularly in the absence of 
effective risk adjustment.4 
Risk adjustment—The ACA provides 
for risk adjustment. Even after medical 
underwriting is prohibited, risks might 
distribute unevenly across insurers, 
accidentally or as a result of consumer 
or insurer behavior that leads to adverse 
selection. Risk adjustment is a tool to 
even out maldistribution of risks across 
plans. For example, if one plan within 
an exchange enrolls a disproportionate 
share of the population with diabetes, 
a risk adjustment could be applied 
to take some premium revenue from 
other plans and transfer it to the plan 
with sicker enrollees. In this way, plans 
are not financially or competitively 
penalized for enrolling higher-need 
people and enrollees do not face higher 
premiums for choosing a plan that tends 
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to be more attractive to those with 
serious conditions.
The potential for adverse selection 
or risk selection increases if health 
insurance is sold in multiple markets—
for example, both inside and outside 
an exchange. There may be incentives 
for insurers or agents to steer risk to 
one market or another (i.e., encourage 
purchasers who are less healthy to 
obtain coverage either inside the 
exchange or outside it) to gain a 
competitive advantage. Under the ACA, 
health insurance can be offered by 
insurers both inside and outside the 
exchange. However, carriers must pool 
the experience of coverage they sell 
both inside and outside the exchange 
and charge the same premium for 
a policy regardless of where it is 
offered. The law also provides for risk 
adjustment to be applied for all policies 
and carriers in the individual market, 
whether in or outside the exchange. 
A similar risk adjustment requirement 
applies to small-group coverage.
In the case of multi-state exchanges 
that share risks across state lines 
(i.e., are not merely set up to take 
advantage of administrative economies 
of scale), the opportunity for selection 
dynamics increases, based on the 
factors discussed previously. If rules and 
required plan features within a multi-
state exchange varied at all from those 
governing plans operating outside the 
exchange in even one state, significant 
adverse selection could occur, possibly 
raising costs for all enrollees across 
the participating states in a multi-state 
exchange. While the law provides for 
the implementation of a risk adjustment 
mechanism across exchange and non-
exchange plans, there is no practical 
experience with such a strategy, and 
it would be difficult under the most 
uniform of circumstances. For example, 
there is no available data today to assess 
the extent to which the Massachusetts 
Connector is adversely selected against 
relative to Massachusetts plans that do 
not participate in the Connector.
Effective risk adjustment is important 
in the context of exchanges generally 
but would be critical for cross-state 
exchanges. While significant advances 
have been made in the development 
of risk adjustment technology (the 
DxCG model is used in multiple states 
already5), access to sufficient data 
can be a constraint. The more claims 
or utilization information carriers 
provide, the better the risk adjustment 
software can assess the relative risk 
of enrollees. However, shortcomings 
in data collection can hinder the 
effectiveness of risk adjustment. In 
California, for example, many managed 
care plans do not collect detailed 
outpatient or prescription drug data as 
a matter of course. Insurers also vary in 
the specificity of data they collect—for 
example, some may collect the first 
three digits of a diagnosis code for a 
patient while others may collect four or 
five digits of the code. Getting insurers 
to collect and report uniform claims 
and diagnosis data for risk adjustment 
purposes will require investing 
resources and time. 
Many decisions must be made to 
implement risk adjustment successfully. 
For example, will adjustments 
be made prospectively based on 
the characteristics of enrollees 
at the beginning of the plan year, 
retrospectively based upon utilization 
during the past year or based on some 
combination? What types of health 
conditions will be used as a basis for 
risk adjustment, and how will they 
be weighted relative to each other in 
calculating the adjustment? All risk 
adjustors do not come up with the 
same answers, making these decisions 
carry significant financial implications 
for different plans. Within a multi-state 
exchange, states would need to agree 
on these choices as well as what to do 
in circumstances when insurers opt out 
of the exchange. For example, insurers 
being assessed under risk adjustment 
due to enrolling a healthier than 
average risk pool could decide to leave 
the exchange to avoid paying. How 
would this be handled? Performing risk 
adjustment without standardized health 
plans across the boundaries of the 
purchasing pool would also be difficult. 
Political and administrative issues 
involving multi-state exchanges—In 
addition, multi-state exchanges would 
tend to dilute the policy-making locus 
to a level not politically accountable. For 
example, state A might seek to limit the 
exchange options to three carriers (e.g., 
in order to exclude high-priced options 
or those that have not hit particular 
quality targets), while state B could 
oppose this approach. Or, in the course 
of certifying exchange-eligible plans and 
insurers, if consumer complaints (for 
example, involving network adequacy) 
arise against a carrier in one state but 
not in another, the multi-state exchange 
would have to weigh whether to 
decertify the plan despite the fact that 
residents of one state may be happy 
with it. These disagreements could 
cause conflicts between member states 
of the same exchange. Thus, decisions 
that improve the functioning of the 
market become more difficult with a 
multi-state exchange.
In summary, exchange policy will 
be a constant balancing act between 
spreading risk, maintaining insurer 
participation, and, in the case of 
multi-state exchanges, ensuring that 
competing interests of different states 
are handled satisfactorily. As a result, 
of the fact that cross-state risk-sharing 
would lead to one state’s population 
effectively subsidizing another state’s 
population and create a complex 
environment for decision-making, multi-
state exchanges are likely to focus on 
shared administrative structures and 
efficiencies as opposed to risk-sharing. 
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1 This brief was adapted from a longer report by 
Linda Blumberg and Karen Pollitz, “Cross-State 
Risk Pooling under Health Care Reform: An 
Analytic Review of the Provisions in the House 
and Senate Bills,” (Washington, DC: The Urban 
Institute, 2010), http://www.urban.org/url.
cfm?ID=412124. 
2 Self-funded plans will not be pooled with fully 
insured plans, however.
3 Matthew Buettgens, John Holahan, Caitlin 
Carroll, “Health Reform across the States: 
Increased Insurance Coverage and Federal 
Spending on the Exchanges and Medicaid,” 
(Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2011), 
http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=412310.
4 Plus, having many plans within an exchange 
can seem attractive from a choice perspective 
but can also make purchasing pools 
significantly less flexible. Getting 25 health 
plans to do something uniformly takes a great 
deal of work and planning. Insurers are much 
better at developing quickly implemented 
strategies to avoid bad risks than an exchange 
with many plans can be at preventing risk 
segmentation. In addition, to the extent that 
multi-state exchanges or enlarged markets 
increase the number of plans offered, the task 
of administering and regulating the market can 
be more difficult.
5 DxCG is one of the commercially available 
claims-based risk assessment tools. A recent 
study analyzed the relative predictive accuracy 
of these tools: see Ross Winkelman and Syed 
Mehmud, “A Comparative Analysis of Claims-
Based Tools for Health Risk Assessment,” 
(Society of Actuaries, 2007), http://soa.org/
files/pdf/risk-assessmentc.pdf.
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